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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] During the course of the twentieth century, American and 
international businesses reacted to the increasing costs and uncertainties of 
the American civil legal system by trying to create certainty through 
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contractual provisions wherever possible.1  In particular, businesses 
developed contractual provisions that set forth procedural boundaries to 
potential disputes for the purpose of providing greater certainty as to 
where the dispute would be heard, who would hear it, and what laws 
would apply.  For example, choice of venue2 and choice of law3 
provisions became commonplace.  In addition, clauses dictating the use of 
alternative dispute resolution procedures were also widely adopted.4  
Substantively, other clauses not only limited liabilities, warranties, and 
damages,5 but also attempted to establish the applicable burden of proof 
                                                 
 
1 See generally Michael Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of 
Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 51, 52 (1992) (“The rise of forum-selection clauses is 
a manifestation of the increasing deference to party autonomy in jurisdictional and related 
matters.  Not coincidentally, the last two decades have also seen the enforcement of 
contractual choice-of-law clauses, and the upholding of waivers of personal jurisdiction 
and service-of-process requirements.”).  Arguably, the power of contracts to modify legal 
procedure began with the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Lochner v. New York, 
enshrining “the liberty of contract” as a Constitutionally-protected right.  See 198 U.S. 
45, 56 (1905).  But see Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486-88 
(1955) (upholding state laws regulating contractual relationships where such laws bear a 
rational relationship to the “health and welfare of the people.”).  Arguably, this same 
process works in reverse whenever a court invokes its power to reject a contract “against 
the public interest” and justifies its decision as serving to protect such an interest (usually 
a significant and concrete one).  See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 
A.2d 69, 87, 95 (N.J. 1960) (voiding express waiver of implied warranty of 
merchantability where incentivizing the sale of damaged vehicles could result in serious 
injuries). 
 
2 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 518 (1974) (“[A] ‘forum clause should 
control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside.’” (quoting Bremen v. Zapata 
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972))). 
 
3 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 
476 (1989) (affirming decision “[i]nterpreting a choice-of-law clause to make applicable 
state rules governing the conduct of arbitration.”). 
 
4 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23-24, 35 (1991) (enforcing 
mandatory arbitration clause of an employment contract for a “Manager of Financial 
Service” and dismissing statutory claim alleging age discrimination). 
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for any given dispute.6  While such provisions have been challenged as 
unenforceable in circumstances of unequal bargaining powerfor 
example contracts between a business and a consumer7or inequitable 
conduct such as fraud,8 by and large courts have enforced these 
provisions, especially in commercial contracts between business 
enterprises.9 
 
[2] At the turn of the twenty-first century, few businesses realized the 
impending challenges that electronic discovery issues would soon bring to 
civil litigation in the United States.10  While businesses had been 
                                                                                                                         
5 See e.g., McCarn v. Pac. Bell Directory, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109, 113 (1992) (upholding 
clause limiting damages to cost of contract services, in light of offer to negotiate). 
6 See Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts To Remake the 
Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 579, 646 (2007) 
(stating that burdens of proof can most likely be modified ex ante by contract, both in 
criminal and civil cases).   
 
7 See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965) 
(“[W]hen a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a 
commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly 
likely that his consent . . . was ever given to all the terms.  In such a case . . . the court 
should consider whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement should 
be withheld.”); cf. Ray Tucker & Sons, Inc. v. GTE Directories Sales Corp., 571 N.W.2d 
64, 70 (D. Neb. 1997) (“[T]he parties’ respective bargaining positions . . . is an essential 
fact upon which any determination of unconscionability depends.”). 
 
8 See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (“‛Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported 
claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming 
economic power that would provide grounds for the revocation of any contract.’”  
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985))). 
 
9See Williams, 350 F.2d at 450 (noting that only in the rarest of circumstances would a 
contract between two businesses reach the legal standard for unconscionability; an 
“extreme” departure from “the mores and business practices of the time and place” would 
have a chance at being found unconscionable). 
 
10 See BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., MANAGING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC 
INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 1 (Federal Judicial Center 2007), available 
at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/eldscpkt.pdf/$file/eldscpkt.pdf. 
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complaining about the costs and delays incurred through allegedly 
“abusive” discovery tactics for dozens of years,11 the first decade of the 
new century witnessed parallel growth of information in each organization 
as well as increased complexity and costs for organizations to defensibly 
preserve, collect, and produce relevant information for litigation matters in 
the United States.12  Moreover, as technology continued to change rapidly, 
the legal system began to evolve to meet new challenges that contrasted 
with those of the old paper world that greatly influenced the initial Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.13  Not surprisingly, many commentators noted 
that the current state of jurisprudence on issues related to discovery in the 
electronic age is nascent,14 which in turn causes great uncertainty for 
                                                 
11 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) advisory committee’s note (1980) (“There has been 
widespread criticism of abuse of discovery.  The Committee has considered a number of 
proposals to eliminate abuse . . . .”); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s 
note (2000) (“The amendment is designed to involve the court more actively in regulating 
. . . discovery.  The Committee has been informed repeatedly by lawyers that 
involvement of the court in managing discovery is an important method of controlling 
problems of inappropriately broad discovery. . . . The Committee intends that the parties 
and the court focus on the actual claims and defenses involved in the action.”); FED. R. 
CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1983) (acknowledging that some attorneys “use 
discovery tools as tactical weapons rather than to expose the facts and illuminate the 
issues by overuse of discovery or unnecessary use of defensive weapons or evasive 
responses,” which “results in excessively costly and time-consuming activities”). 
 
12 See John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation 
Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 564-70 (2010). 
 
13 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) advisory committee’s note (2006) (amending the rules to 
“recogniz[e] that a party must disclose electronically stored information as well as 
documents.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note (2006) (stating that the 
purpose of the amendment was “designed to address issues raised by difficulties in 
locating, retrieving, and providing discovery of some [ESI]. . . . [when] burdens and costs 
may make the information on such sources not reasonably accessible”).   
 
14 See Geoff Howard & Seth Weisburst, Trends in Electronic Discovery After the 
December 1, 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in ELECTRONIC 
DISCOVERY AND RETENTION GUIDANCE FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL 2007 at 13, 33 (PLI 
Litigation and Administrative Practice Source Handbook Series No. 766, 2007) (finding 
little impact, positive or otherwise, one year after the 2006 addition of “ESI” to the civil 
rules, stating that “[i]t will take more time, and more cases, to definitively determine how 
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companies as to how their preservation, collection, and production steps 
will be judged in hindsight. 
 
[3] With this background, consideration should be given to whether 
contractual provisions can provide greater certainty and direction to 
parties than the current and future state of law pertaining to electronic 
discovery issues.  Specifically, much of the uncertainty, excess costs, and 
burdens related to electronic discovery in the world of commercial 
litigation can be obviated through the mutual adoption and ratification of 
terms conscribing the scope of discovery in the event of a dispute that 
would be the subject of arbitration or litigation.15  In essence, such clauses 
would provide a pre-defined set of fair rules that the parties agree to 
follow in a dispute relating to any preservation or discovery of 
electronically stored information. 
 
[4] To explore the viability of such provisions, this article first 
identifies the type of model clauses that could be included in commercial 
contracts.  For each type of clause, the potential benefits and risks 
                                                                                                                         
courts will define and apply each of the new electronic discovery amendments”).  The 
doctrine is indeed continuing to evolve.  New rules are being contemplated yet none are 
expected to be published in the immediate future (as of May 29, 2012).  See Federal 
Rules Published for Comment, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/PublishedRules.aspx 
(last visited May. 29, 2012); Civil Rules Suggestions, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/Federal 
Rulemaking/ResearchingRules/CivilRulesSuggestions.aspx (last visited May, 29, 2012). 
 
15 Contractual modification of the litigation process was identified as “a rich avenue for 
future research” by Robert Scott and George Triantis in their article Anticipating 
Litigation in Contract Design.  115 YALE L.J. 814, 857 (2006).  Surprisingly, the authors 
note that while “arbitration and venue clauses are common in contracts and widely 
discussed in the literature, the fact that parties can vary the rules of litigation in their ex 
ante contract is relatively unexplored” and they were “hard pressed . . . to find scholarly 
treatises on procedure or evidence that identify the subset of these rules that are default 
rather than mandatory provisions.”  Id.  However, discovery is only briefly mentioned by 
the same authors who lament the lack of sources in the area at large; “the parties 
themselves may further reduce litigation costs by consent. . . . [t]hey can do so narrowly, 
by stipulating facts or agreeing to limited discovery.”  Id. at 831. 
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presented by these provisions as they relate to discovery in civil litigation 
are identified.  Next, the general applicability of public policy doctrines 
and whether such discovery-limiting provisions would be viewed by 
courts with favor or disfavor are explored.  Thereafter, this article analyzes 
the potential legal arguments that could be raised to challenge the 
enforceability of such provisions.   
 
[5] In sum, there is considerable merit for considering contractual 
provisions that set forth common ground for handling the preservation, 
collection, and production of information by parties to commercial 
contracts that may later become involved in related disputes.  Equally 
important, it is likely that such provisions will be uniformly upheld and 
enforced absent unique circumstances. 
 
II.  LIMITING PROSPECTIVE LITIGATION PRESERVATION AND 
DISCOVERY DUTIES BY CONTRACT:  ASSESSING THE BUSINESS UTILITY 
AND RISK 
 
[6] Contractual limitations on future discovery obligations and 
liabilities can take one or more of five forms: (1) absence of a preservation 
duty unless a notice or a request to preserve is served; (2) limitations on 
the amount of discovery allowed, including the amount of preservation 
required; (3) mechanics governing preservation and production decisions 
in a predictable framework; (4) procedures allocating the costs for 
ordinary and extraordinary discovery sought; and (5) agreed restrictions 
on sanctions for purported discovery failure.  After identifying the general 
benefits of a contractual approach to prospective preservation and 
discovery obligations, each category of proposed clauses is discussed 
below, including an identification of potential benefits and drawbacks 
from a business and litigation standpoint.  Each business should assess its 
own risk profile and the value that could be obtained by such clauses 
before including them in any contract negotiations.   
 
A. Overview of Benefits to Contract Clauses Governing 
Prospective Preservation and Discovery Obligations 
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[7] Discovery-limiting clauses are designed to provide benefits in 
three ways: reducing the costs of preservation; reducing the costs of 
production; and reducing the risk of incurring sanctions.16  These benefits 
arise primarily by establishing limits on the scope of preservation and the 
volume of production, thereby eliminating the costs of over-preservation 
and over-production.17  Additionally, parties are aware of their specific 
obligations under the terms of the agreement, which should greatly 
decrease the chances of being sanctioned for discovery failures, while 
simultaneously reducing the costs associated with motions for production 
and sanctions. 
 
[8] While spoliation sanctions can have substantial monetary costs 
associated with them, including indirect costs,18 the costs of preservation 
and production are most often cited as the biggest components of 
discovery expenses.19  Perhaps this is because sanctions are quite rare 
when compared to the omnipresence of significant preservation burdens.20  
While it is clear that more research is needed in this area, basic estimates 
and anecdotal evidence suggest that the costs are significant.  For 
example, in In re Aspartame Antitrust, the three prevailing defendants 
were awarded a combined $510,000 in electronic discovery costs, 
                                                 
16 See FED. R. CIV. P. 29 advisory committee’s note (1993); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.423 (2004); The Sedona Conference®, The Case for 
Cooperation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 339, 343 (2009). 
 
17 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.423; Thomas Y. Allman, 
Managing Preservation Obligations After the 2006 Federal E-Discovery Amendments, 13 
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, ¶¶ 16-18 (2007). 
 
18 See Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607 (S.D. Tex. 
2010) (“Spoliation allegations and sanctions motions distract from the merits of a case, 
add costs to discovery, and delay resolution.”). 
 
19 See Beisner, supra note 12, at 566, 570.   
 
20 See id. at 569-70.  Compare Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 
2001), with Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the 
Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789 (2010). 
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amounting to an average of $170,000 per litigant.21  The Sedona 
Conference provides a more scalable estimate in its 2007 Best Practice 
Commentary on the Use of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in 
E-Discovery, wherein it stated that each gigabyte costs about $30,000 to 
review for relevance and privilege.22  In addition, none of these cost 
figures included the costs associated with in-house counsel’s time, the 
implementation of preservation policies and tools, or the disruption to 
employees’ productivity when dealing with legal holds and collection. 
 
[9] The predictability and limitations envisioned by the contractual 
language provide protections for both requesting and responding parties.  
For example, there is recognition that additional measures may be needed 
in certain cases but there is a counter-weight of indemnification provisions 
to ensure that people only seek extraordinary discovery when truly 
necessary.  As for routine discovery, the provisions provide clear 
guideposts that should avoid disputes and collateral motions practice 
altogether.  Additionally, the potential for a party to be harmed by limits 
on preservation duties and limits on the scope and volume of production 
should be minimal.  
 
[10] The costs of drafting and enforcing discovery-limiting provisions 
should also be de minimis.  First, the contract is already being negotiated 
and agreed upon, so there will be few costs associated with that phase of 
the agreement process.  Second, the language is general enough that it can 
be drafted quickly and adapted to the circumstances.  Third, once language 
is drafted and accepted into one set of contracts, it will likely spread into a 
variety of different contracts with only slight modifications required.  
Lastly, as companies become more familiar with preservation and 
production under this type of agreement, they should be able to optimize 
the contract language, as well as their internal policies and practices to 
meet the specified obligations, to further reduce costs and burdens. 
                                                 
21 817 F. Supp. 2d 608, 623 (E.D. Pa. 2011).  
 
22 See The Sedona Conference®, The Sedona Conference Best Practices Commentary on 
the Use of Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 
189, 192 (2007). 




B.  Potential Contractual Clauses Related to Prospective 
Preservation and Discovery Obligations 
 
1.  Notice of Preservation Duty and Request to Preserve 
 
[11] This type of clause could provide that no party to the contract has 
any affirmative obligation to preserve evidence absent a specific written 
request from another party.  The clause could likewise preclude any party 
from seeking sanctions due to the failure to preserve evidence absent the 
written notice.  As with all contractual provisions, the clause could simply 
require a written request or prescribe that the request be very detailed in 
terms of time frame, subject matter scope, and even target sources of 
information for preservation.23 
 
[12] This type of provision has the obvious benefit of eliminating the 
guesswork surrounding the trigger of preservation duties.  Indeed, many 
organizations have discussed the practical difficulties posed by an ex post 
analysis of the “reasonable anticipation” of litigation,24 and recent 
commentary has suggested that the resulting over-preservation imposes a 
staggering burden on companies.25 
                                                 
23 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981) (stating terms of a 
contract must be “reasonably certain”).  
 
24 See Rimkus Consulting Grp. Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (S.D. Tex. 
2010) (noting the difficulty of making “bright-line distinctions between acceptable and 
unacceptable conduct in preserving information . . . either prospectively or with the 
benefit (and distortion) of hindsight”).  
 
25 Compare Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 436 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Until a more precise definition is created by rule, a party is well-
advised to ‘retain all relevant documents . . . in existence at the time the duty to preserve 
attaches.’  In this respect, ‘relevance’ . . . is ‘an extremely broad concept.’” (quoting 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
Condit v. Dunne, 225 F.R.D. 100, 105 (S.D.N.Y 2004))), with Letter from Microsoft 
Corporation to Hon. David G. Campbell, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules Chair,  
U. S. Dist. Court 5 (Aug. 31, 2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 




[13] The downside to this type of provision is two-fold.  First, it does 
not obviate the potential need to preserve information relevant to non-
contractual disputes between the parties and other persons, nor does it 
affect any statutory or regulatory obligations to retain information.26  
Thus, it could create a false sense of security if organizations overly rely 
on the existence of such clauses.  An organization should completely 
analyze any potential for non-contractual claims before relying solely on 
this type of contractual provision in managing its information and records. 
 
[14] Second, one party may lose the opportunity to demonstrate its 
legitimate claims or defenses under the contract if another party destroys 
pertinent information prior to receipt of any written notice demanding 
preservation.27  This observation cuts to the heart of the matter.  A party 
could prospectively give up the right to obtain information relating to 
valuable claims or defenses, but it is done knowingly and in service of the 
greater good of streamlining and reducing the expense of the dispute 
resolution process. 
 
2.  Limitations on the Amount of Preservation and 
Discovery Required 
 
[15] These types of provisions set forth agreed upon limits on 
preservation and discovery efforts that the parties may have to 
                                                                                                                         
RulesAndPolicies/rules/DallasMiniConf_Comments/Microsoft.pdf (“[F]or each one-page 
trial exhibit, Microsoft produces an average of 1000 pages, manually reviews more than 
4500 pages, collects and processes more than 90,000 pages, and preserves almost 
340,000 pages. . . . This costs money.  But the hard dollars Microsoft spends on data 
storage, attorney fees, licensing fees and employee salaries do not reflect the business 
disruption and full impact on productivity.”). 
 
26 E.g., Stored Communication Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) (2006); see also California v. 
Wilson, 236 Cal. Rptr. 280, 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). 
 
27 See generally 8 FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION LAW MANUAL, Spoilation of Evidence § 
16:21 (2012) (indicating that destruction of evidence does not always warrant harsh 
sanctions). 
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undertake.28  For example, the parties to the contract may agree that no 
party must resort to the preservation of back-up media in connection with 
any dispute under the contract.  Another example could be agreeing to 
forego any forensic analysis of computers to identify and review deleted 
data of any type.  Yet another example could be agreeing to a preset limit 
of the files of no more than five custodians being subject to preservation, 
collection, and production in the event of a dispute under the contract.  In 
some ways, these types of clauses are akin to adoption language that has 
surfaced in model orders29 and default standards issued by courts around 
the country. 
 
[16] One significant benefit of these provisions is a limitation on the 
amount of effort undertaken in any given dispute under the contract.  
Another significant benefit is certainty in the efforts required to be 
defensible in the event of a dispute. 
 
[17] The downside to such provisions is the expected problem of 
needing information from more persons or places than a party is entitled 
under the contract clauses.  Another equally significant problem occurs 
when a party chooses five individuals (under the example) in good faith as 
the targeted custodians only to learn a few months later that a sixth 
individual is really the key player in the dispute. 
    
3.  Mechanics to Govern Preservation and Production 
Decisions and Disputes in a Predictable Framework 
 
                                                 
28 See D. Md. Loc. Adm. R. app. A [hereinafter Md. Guidelines], available at 
http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/publications/forms/DiscoveryGuidelines.pdf (outlining the 
Discovery Guidelines for the United States District Court for the District of Maryland). 
 
29 E.g., E.D. Tex. Civ. R. app. P, available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-
bin/view_document.cgi?document=22217 (providing the “[MODEL] ORDER 
REGARDING E-DISCOVERY IN PATENT CASES”); see also Md. Guidelines, supra 
note 30 (“The parties . . . are encouraged to submit to the Court for approval their 
agreements to expand or limit discovery.”).  
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[18] These types of provisions could be the equivalent of mandatory 
ADR provisions whereby the parties agree in advance as to how particular 
issues (i.e., number of discovery requests and completeness of responses) 
will be addressed and decided among the parties or by a neutral arbiter in a 
cost effective fashion.30  One possibility is an agreement as to the type of 
search methodologies that may be required or acceptable to the parties, 
such as keyword or computer-assisted review.  Another possibility could 
be provisions dealing with the manner by which preservation and 
discovery from persons and sources outside of the United States would be 
handled to best ensure compliance with any foreign personal data 
protection laws.  Conceivably, the parties could agree in advance on a 
particular neutral party or organization with whom to consult in regard to 
discovery disputes.  Again, these are but a few examples of the types of 
clauses that could be devised. 
 
[19] The benefits of these types of clauses include removing the risk 
that an already over-burdened court will have to address preservation and 
discovery disputes in an ad hoc fashion.31  The parties will also benefit 
from having a better sense of the types of disputes that could be raised as 
well as the likely range of outcomes, thereby decreasing the uncertainty 
surrounding discovery practice.  
 
[20] The drawbacks might include the inadvertent creation of a system 
of satellite dispute resolution for discovery issues that, if not managed 
well, could balloon to defeat the stated objective of reducing disputes and 
lowering costs.  Another potential downside could be agreeing in advance 
to limitations that, when the dispute arises, significantly impair the ability 
                                                 
30 Observers have frequently cited predictability as a leading benefit of contractually-
determine legal procedures.  See, e.g., Linda Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, 
Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 
FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 294 (1988) (“The doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure . 
. . is lauded for enhancing the values of predictability, certainty, security, stability and 
simplicity.”). 
 
31 See id. at 294-95.  
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to obtain and use information that would be helpful to support claims or 
defenses. 
 
4.  Procedures to Allocate the Costs for Ordinary and/or 
Extraordinary Discovery  
 
[21] This type of clause would provide specific guidance to the 
contracting parties as to who pays for the preservation and discovery costs 
in the event of a dispute.  The clause could be as simple as prohibiting any 
type of fee shifting or sharing or it could require that the requesting party 
pay for all discovery sought, as well as any requested specific preservation 
steps.  Alternatively, it could establish a specific formula by which certain 
costs are shared or shifted. 
 
[22] The advantages of such provisions again come from the certainty 
as to process and the mutual incentives to control costs.  Indeed, including 
such provisions would likely result in more cost-sharing or cost-shifting 
opportunities because most courts shy away from cost allocation in 
ordinary litigation, usually citing the American rule on litigation costs.32  
Disadvantages include the fact that a predetermined cost allocation 
formula may make pursuit of a claim or defense far more expensive than it 
would be absent the contract language.  Another potential disadvantage is 
the complexity that might be required if the parties want to create a series 
of presumptions that need to be assessed and applied in any given dispute. 
 
5.  Agreed Restrictions on Sanctions for Purported 
Discovery Failures 
 
[23] A preemptive limitation on the sanctions that could be sought by a 
party if another party failed to preserve or produce relevant information 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Last Atlantis Capital, LLC v. AGS Specialist Partners, No. 04 C 0397, 2011 
WL 6097769, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2011) (rejecting request for cost-shifting, the court 
noted The Sedona Conference recognized that cost-shifting was “inconsistent with the so 
called ‘American Rule’ that each party bears its own litigation costs” and that “[t]he party 
seeking cost-shifting . . . bears the burden of overcoming that presumption.”). 
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could be very beneficial to both parties to a contract.  The clear advantage 
to such a provision would be eliminating the risks currently attendant to 
discovery today where any failure or mistake, no matter how innocent, 
instantly can be magnified into negligence, or worse to support an award 
of sanctions ranging from monetary penalties to case-altering jury 
instructions to outright dismissal of claims or defenses.  A downside is the 
risk that a bad actor takes advantage of such protections to destroy 
relevant information with impunity, thereby impairing the claims or 
defenses of relatively innocent parties. 33  Careful drafting of this clause 
should allow parties to eliminate the uncertainty surrounding negligent 
conduct and limit any sanctions to those situations only involving actual 
and knowing malfeasance. 
 
[24] Sample contract language for these five categories of clauses is 
described further in Part V and set forth in the Appendix.  While there are 
infinite variations as to the language that could be employed in any of 
these five categories, the potential benefits of clarity, risk reduction, and 
cost savings are well worth exploration by entities involved in a 
significant number of commercial.  It is important for companies to be 
well-informed and seek counsel when considering the relative value of 
including such contract language.   
 
III.  LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR CONTRACTUAL DISCOVERY LIMITATIONS 
 
[25] While no judicial decisions exist directly addressing this issue, 
established law supports the enforceability of other contractual 
modifications to the litigation processparticularly a small set of near-
ubiquitous provisions that include venue, jury waiver, choice of law, and 
                                                 
33 See, e.g., Rosenthal Collins Grp., LLC v. Trading Tech. Int’l., Inc., No. 05 C 4088, 
2011 WL 722467, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2011) (assessing one million dollars in fines 
against plaintiff, requiring plaintiff to pay attorney’s fees and court costs, and entering 
default judgment in favor of defendant).  Rosenthal provides a particularly accurate 
representation of the downside of limiting sanctions, as the court fined the plaintiff twice 
for modifying data submitted to the court.  Id. 
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arbitration clauses.34  The jurisprudence regarding enforceability of such 
contractual provisions is informative with regard to legal support for 
contractual clauses that limit prospective preservation and discovery 
obligations. 
 
[26] Many courts have upheld choice of venue or forum selection 
provisions.35  Generally, a forum selection clause is enforceable unless it 
“contravene[s] a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is 
brought, whether declared by statute or judicial decision.”36  Courts have 
refined this mandate to hold that 
  
[a] forum-selection clause is unenforceable if it is 
determined that any of the three following circumstances 
are applicable: (1) enforcement of the clause would 
effectively prevent a party from having his day in court; (2) 
the forum-selection clause itself was procured by 
overreaching or fraud; or (3) the [c]ourt’s enforcement of 
the forum-selection clause would violate a strong public 
policy.37   
 
Our informal survey of cases indicates that most challenges to forum 
selection clauses fail because there exist few fact situations that implicate 
the policy considerations identified by the Supreme Court in Bremen.38 
 
                                                 
34 See generally Liles v. Ginn-La W. End, Ltd., 631 F.3d 1242, 1256-57 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(finding a forum-selection clause and an arbitration clause enforceable); Speed v. Omega 
Protein, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 668, 672 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (considering a forum-selection 
clause in determining proper venue). 
 
35 See Liles, 631 F.3d at 1243; Speed, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 673. 
 
36 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).  
 
37 See Speed, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 672.  
 
38 See e.g., Liles, 631 F.3d at 1243 (holding the forum-selection clause enforceable). 
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[27] Likewise, courts have routinely upheld choice of law provisions 
even though they affect the substantive outcomes of disputes.39  Section 
187 of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws provides in pertinent 
part:  
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern 
their contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if 
the particular issue is one which the parties could not have 
resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement 
directed to that issue, unless either 
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the 
parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable 
basis for the parties' choice, or 
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be 
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a 
materially greater interest than the chosen state in the 
determination of the particular issue and which, under the 
rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the 
absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.40 
 
[28] Comment e to Section 187 of the Restatement sets forth the basic 
rationale of having such clauses: 
 
Prime objectives of contract law are to protect the justified 
expectations of the parties and to make it possible for them 
to foretell with accuracy what will be their rights and 
liabilities under the contract.  These objectives may best be 
attained in multistate transactions by letting the parties 
choose the law to govern the validity of the contract and the 
rights created thereby.  In this way, certainty and 
                                                 
 
39 E.g., Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Aalco Express Co., 592 F. Supp. 
664, 667 (E.D. Mo. 1984); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 469 A.2d 867, 887 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1984); Morris v. Watsco, Inc., 433 N.E.2d 886, 889 (Mass. 1982); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971). 
 
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue 4 
 
 17 
predictability of result are most likely to be secured.  
Giving parties this power of choice is also consistent with 
the fact that, in contrast to other areas of the law, persons 
are free within broad limits to determine the nature of their 
contractual obligations.41 
 
[29] Courts have routinely upheld choice of law provisions,42 yet there 
are notable circumstances where exceptions apply and courts do not 
enforce the provisions.43  In almost all of the exceptions, courts have 
found a fundamental issue of state law that was outcome determinative 
(e.g., whether claims would be barred by a different statute of limitations 
or whether one state recognized a cause of action not recognized by 
another).44 
 
[30] With respect to mandatory arbitration provisions, such clauses 
have been enforced in situations where there is some inequality in 
bargaining power (between companies and their employees),45 where the 
arbitration agreement is part of a standardized non-negotiable form,46 and 
                                                 
 
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. e (1971). 
 
42 See, e.g., N. Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Point Judith Marina, LLC, 579 F.3d 61, 72 (1st Cir. 
2010) (enforcing choice of law provision); see also PAE Gov’t Servs, Inc. v. MPRI, Inc., 
514 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2007). 
   
43 See, e.g., Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225, 227, 230-31 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(predicting that, if the claims at issue were of such a low value as effectively to preclude 
relief when decided individually, then the New Jersey Supreme Court would hold that the 
agreements’ choice of Utah law, which expressly allowed class-arbitration waivers, was 
unenforceable under New Jersey choice-of-law rules, because it would violate a 
fundamental public policy of New Jersey). 
 
44 See e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941) (holding 
that federal courts may not, by enforcing an independent “general law” of conflict of 
laws, controvert local policies pursued by a state within limits permitted by the 
Constitution). 
 
45 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991). 
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where the claims to be arbitrated are torts.47  Nevertheless, there are still 
limits to courts’ enforcement of arbitration clauses.  For example, in Cole 
v. Burns International Security Services, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
refused to enforce an arbitration clause that required employees to pay for 
the services of an arbitrator beyond any reasonable costs, such as filing or 
administrative expenses.48  Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has 
observed that the costs of arbitration should not prohibit the adjudication 
of wrongs.49  However, the Court nevertheless held that when “a party 
seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration 
would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing 
the likelihood of incurring such costs.”50  It is also important to note that 
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)51 has been frequently cited as a 
significant factor in support of enforcing arbitration clauses,52 and the 
Supreme Court has recognized a clear federal policy in favor of 
arbitration.53  In short, mandatory arbitration clauses are upheld in the 
majority of cases, including those involving unequal bargaining power.   
 
[31] Based on decisions analyzing the enforceability of forum selection, 
choice of law, and arbitration clauses, it is very likely that the contractual 
discovery limitations described herein will be enforceable between 
                                                                                                                         
46 See, e.g., Battle v. Prudential Ins. Co., 973 F. Supp. 861, 867 (D. Minn. 1997). 
 
47 See, e.g., Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc’y v. JRY, 320 F. App’x 216, 222 (5th 
Cir. 2009). 
 
48 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 
49 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000). 
 
50 Id. at 92. 
 
51 United States Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). 
 
52 See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 
(1983). 
 
53 See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 91; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 
___, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).  
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commercial parties of sufficient sophistication, especially with drafting 
tailored to the facts of the contractual relationship.  There is ample legal 
authority that illustrates that public policy in fact supports cooperative 
efforts to limit discovery consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure54 
and its state court analogues.55  Moreover, ample support exists to support 
the proposition that since the mid 1970’s, public policy has favored 
meaningful limits on civil discovery.56  For example, in 1976 an American 
Bar Association (“ABA”) task force was established to address the unfair 
use of the discovery process.57   In the process of studying the question, an 
ABA committee concluded that discovery abuses broke down into three 
common complaints: first, discovery was too costly; second, discovery 
procedures were being misused; and third, discovery was subject to 
“overuse.”58 
                                                 
 
54 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that rules should be administered to “secure the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”). 
 
55 See William A. Gross Constr. Assocs. v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 134, 136 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[T]he best solution in the entire area of electronic discovery is 
cooperation among counsel. This Court strongly endorses The Sedona Conference 
Proclamation.”); see also The Sedona Conference, The Case for Cooperation, 10 
SEDONA CONF. J. 339, 342 (2009); AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & THE INST. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE 
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE 
INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM at 2 (2009), 
available at  http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm? 
Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4008. 
 
56 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) advisory committee’s note (1970) (explaining that, in 
the 1970 amendment to subdivision (c), “drafting changes [were] made to carry out and 
clarify the sense of the rule” and “[i]nsertions [were] made to avoid any possible 
implication that a protective order does not extend to ‘time’ as well as to ‘place’ or may 
not safeguard against ‘undue burden or expense’”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 33(c) 
advisory committee’s note (1970) (noting that the purpose of the 1970 amendment adding 
subdivision (c) to FRCP 33 was to give “the party an option to make the records available 
and place the burden of research on the party who seeks the information”). 
 
57 See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF POUND CONFERENCE FOLLOW-UP TASK FORCE 
(1976), reprinted in 74 F.R.D. 159, 191 (1976). 
 




[32] The 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
were enacted in response to the many and frequent calls for discovery 
reform.59  States thereafter implemented their own reforms, with many 
adopting the same or similar provisions to ensure a proportional approach 
to discovery in civil matters.60  In enacting the 1983 rules, the Advisory 
Committee noted that “[e]xcessive discovery and evasion or resistance to 
reasonable discovery requests pose significant problems.”61  Accordingly, 
Rule 26(b)(1) was amended to grant courts the authority to limit discovery 
where it was found to be redundant or duplicative.62  The Committee 
Notes to the 1983 Amendments indicate that Rule 26(b)(1)(iii) was 
designed to address the problem of disproportionate discovery, and lists 
factors to be considered when determining proportionality: the “nature and 
complexity” of the lawsuit, “the importance of the issues at stake,” the 
parties’ resources, and “the significance of the substantive issues.”63  The 
Committee Notes also explicitly state that public policy concerns might 
have importance beyond the monetary amount at stake and the 
proportionality calculus should include this more esoteric consideration.64  
                                                                                                                         
58 American Bar Association, Comments on Revised Proposed Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1979) (on file with author). 
 
59 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1983). 
  
60 See Patricia A. Ebener, INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COURT EFFORTS TO REDUCE 
PRETRIAL DELAY: A NATIONAL INVENTORY, at xi-xii (1981) (noting that, by 1980, 
twenty-nine states had implemented reforms to expedite pretrial discovery, which ranged 
from limiting the number of interrogatories that a party could request, to “[a]ssigning 
penalties to attorneys who bring frivolous [discovery] motions”). 
 
61 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1983). 
 
62 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note (1983) (explaining that the 
objective of the 1983 amendment was “to guard against redundant or disproportionate 
discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may be 
directed to matters that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry”). 
 
63 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1983). 
 
64 Id. 
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The Advisory Committee further explained that the Rule sought to “reduce 
repetitiveness and to oblige lawyers to think through their discovery 
activities in advance so that full utilization is made of each deposition, 
document request, or set of interrogatories.”65  To effectuate this mandate, 
courts were expected to apply the rules in an even-handed manner, thereby 
preventing the use of discovery as a means of coercion or as a tool in a 
“war of attrition.”66 
 
[33] In light of this history and thirty years of jurisprudence in which 
courts have routinely entered and enforced the parties’ case management 
agreements and otherwise imposed limits on civil discovery, there is 
ample ground to conclude that public policy would favor contractual 
clauses that prescribe limits on preservation and discovery before disputes 
arise.  Moreover, unless there is fraud or duress in the contracting process, 
there are no clearly identifiable general, federal, or state policies that are 
contrary to the use of such clauses.  Thus, examination of the 
enforceability of such clauses will turn on particular facts regarding the 
circumstances of the contracting, which is addressed in the next section.  
 
IV.  POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO THE ENFORCEABILITY OF 
CONTRACTUAL LIMITATIONS ON PROSPECTIVE PRESERVATION AND 
DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS IN CIVIL LITIGATION 
 
[34] The potential benefits of contractual preservation and discovery 
limitations can be washed away entirely if the specific proposed 
provisions are found unenforceable for any reason.  Indeed, for each 
measure of uncertainty of the enforceability of a given provision, there is a 
corresponding diminishment of the benefits as the parties are forced to 
hedge proportionately against the risk of the provision’s failure.  Thus, it is 
critical to examine the possible challenges to contract provisions of the 




66 Id.  
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue 4 
 
 22 
type suggested in this article and the likely outcome of such challenges 
before businesses start incorporating such provisions into contracts. 
 
[35] At the outset, it should be understood that like other parts of the 
civil litigation process, discovery is not constitutionally mandated and is 
therefore subject to waiver and modification according to the same rules 
of enforceability that govern most contractual agreements.67  Therefore, 
courts assess the enforceability of such contract provisions in light of 
whether they violate public policy, are unconscionable, shield parties from 
tort liability, purport to waive any third parties’ rights, or improperly usurp 
judicial authority or procedural rules.68  The sections below walk through 
each of these potential challenges and predict possible outcomes. 
 
A.  Contracts Against the Public Interest 
 
[36] Courts have long been reluctant to nullify agreements for allegedly 
violating public policy, a power the Supreme Court of Nebraska called 
                                                 
67 See Developments in the Law - Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 979 n.301 (1991) 
(stating “a court may refuse to enforce a discovery modification if it is unconscionable” 
just like other contract provisions); cf. Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting 
for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 545 (2011) (“As for limitations on 
discovery, a large body of literature emphasizes the importance of full discovery to 
judicial decisions in such areas of the law as employment discrimination and consumer 
protection, in which claims, legal theories, and evidentiary proofs cannot be developed 
without a rich factual base.  Similarly, commentators point to the relevance of tort actions 
for improving federal agency policymaking by encouraging the disclosure of 
information.”). 
 
68 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 
(1985) (“Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the 
agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power 
that would provide grounds ‘for the revocation of any contract,’” (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 
(2006))).  Because these doctrines have sprung from common law, their precise contours 
are defined by the laws of the various states, as well as some influential federal cases like 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).  However, although there is no 
established federal common law for enforcing these rules, convergence over the course of 
contracts’ lengthy American history has resulted in significant interstate consistency.  
Thus, the validity of commercial agreements to limit discovery will likely be answered in 
a similar way by state and federal courts in different jurisdictions. 
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“delicate and undefined.”69  That being said, an affected party may argue 
that limiting the availability of established procedures under state and 
federal laws, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is against the 
public interest because it diminishes or eliminates the states’ critical role 
of adjudicating disputes through public forums.  Indeed, many courts have 
stated that broad discovery is a “cornerstone of the litigation process 
contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”70     
 
[37] Public policy objections prevail in those instances where the 
contract language at issue impairs an independent fundamental interest of 
the state.71  A reputable summary of the public policy considerations 
weighing against clauses was recently set forth by Kevin Davis and Helen 
Hershkoff; identifying first, “a large body of literature [that] emphasizes 
the importance of full discovery to judicial decisions in such areas of the 
law as employment discrimination and consumer protection, in which 
claims, legal theories, and evidentiary proofs cannot be developed without 
a rich factual base,” and second, “the relevance of tort actions for 
improving federal agency policymaking by encouraging the disclosure of 
information,” in products liability cases and some class action suits.72  For 
                                                 
 
69 See Custer Pub. Power Dist. v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 75 N.W.2d 619, 628-29 
(Neb. 1956). 
 
70 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (quoting Jones v. Goord, No. 95 Civ. 8026, 2002 WL 1007614, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 16, 2002)); see also Wood v. Capital One Servs., LLC, No. 5:09–CV–1445, 2011 
WL 2154279, *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2011) (quoting Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 311). 
 
71 See, e.g., Mason v. Orthodontic Ctrs. of Colo., Inc., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1216-17 (D. 
Colo. 2007) (finding the public interest prohibiting fee splitting outweighed a fee-
splitting contract provision); Aurora Nat. Life Assurance Co. v. Harrison, 462 F. Supp. 
2d 951, 971-72 (S.D. Iowa 2006), aff'd, sub nom. Aurora Nat. Life Assurance Co. v. 
Ewing, 527 F.3d 1358 (8th Cir. 2008).  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS §178 (1981) (terms of agreements are unenforceable if enforcement is 
outweighed by public policy). 
 
72 Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 67, at 545. 
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example, in Brack v. Omni Loan Company, the California Fourth District 
Court of Appeal declined to enforce a choice of law provision that would 
have prevented California citizens from prevailing on claims against a 
Nevada lender.73  The court stated that enforcement of the provision 
would conflict with a “fundamental policy” of California, “in 
circumstances in which California has a greater interest than Nevada” (i.e., 
where California citizens were being harmed).74  Another example is 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., where the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey decided that auto manufacturers’ express waiver of the implied 
warranty of merchantability was “inimical” to the public interest where it 
would bar tort claims for injuries arising from latent automobile defects.75 
 
[38] Nevertheless, public policy is not a likely bar to enforcing 
agreements that limit the scope of discovery where the goal is to prevent 
excessive preservation and production and the limitations only apply in the 
context of commercial contracts between business entities.  It seems 
unlikely that any party could identify a “fundamental” public interest 
mandating extensive discovery in civil claims between sophisticated 
litigants, and it is uncertain how any other person could intervene to assert 
such an interest.  Even if the effect of the limitation would limit or 
preclude claims, in light of the relatively equal bargaining power and 
deference to contractual relations, it is unlikely that a court would 
intervene and invalidate a limitation based upon a public policy exception.  
Finally, in light of the emergence of state and federal efforts to encourage 
more limited and tailored discovery over the past three decades,76 it does 
not appear likely that challenges to discovery limitations based on public 
policy grounds will be successful absent some very unique circumstances, 
                                                 




75 161 A.2d 69, 87 (N.J. 1960) (denying release of liability for grossly negligent handling 
of consumer automobiles by dealership, despite express waiver of the implied warranty 
of merchantability by contract). 
 
76 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (1993). 
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such as the widespread intentional destruction of evidence or some other 
unquestionably “bad” act while purportedly acting in compliance with the 
contractual provisions.    
 
B.  Unconscionability 
 
[39] Unconscionability is a finding that a contract or clause should not 
be enforced because the terms are so one-sided that “no reasonable person 
would make them and no fair and honest person would accept them.”77  
Certainly influenced by the public interest in not having fellow citizens 
taken advantage of, unconscionability analysis is nevertheless slightly 
more grounded and formalized.  It is composed of two parts: procedural 
and substantive unconscionability.78  Procedural unconscionability 
describes a situation where the contractual process is so unfair that one 
party has not been given any meaningful choice.79  While substantive 
unconscionability involves one party using a pronounced advantage in 
bargaining power to achieve unfair terms.80  Most jurisdictions have 
decided that substantive unconscionability is sufficient to void an 
agreement while a few jurisdictions require both the procedural and 
substantive components.81  Practically speaking, courts will often gloss 
over these subtle distinctions and concentrate on the essence of 
unconscionability: “a gross inequality of bargaining power.”82 
 
                                                 
77 See Fanning v. Fritz’s Pontiac-Cadillac-Buick, 472 S.E.2d 242, 245 (S.C. 1996) (citing 
Jones Leasing v. Gene Phillips & Assoc., 318 S.E.2d 31 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984)). 
 
78 See 8 Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 






81 See Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz. 1995) (concluding that 
substantive unconscionability is sufficient for a finding of unenforceability). 
 
82 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); cf. Ray 
Tucker & Sons v. GTE Directories Sales Corp., 571 N.W.2d 64, 70 (Neb. 1997). 
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[40] Although the doctrine is described in comparative terms, it would 
be more accurate in the commercial setting to say that a contract will be 
enforced if both parties meet a minimum level of sophistication.  For 
example, in Myers v. Nebraska Investment Council, an investment 
company argued that its agreement with the State of Nebraska was 
unconscionable because the State had far more resources at its disposal.83  
While the underlying claim was true with respect to total assets, the 
district court rejected the legal conclusion, noting that “substantive 
unconscionability [in a commercial setting, standing] alone is usually 
insufficient to void a contract or clause.”84  The Eighth Circuit endorsed a 
similar approach in Faber v. Menard, Inc., finding that an agreement 
between a “large national company” and an employee was not 
“automatically unconscionable.”85  Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that 
“it is not enough that the parties have unequal bargaining power, a vast 
disparity is required.”86  In other words, an agreement would have to be 
inconsistent with regular business practices to an “extreme” degree to be 
unconscionable.87  Due to that high standard, the paradigm for 
unconscionability remains “contracts of adhesion” between large 
corporations and consumers.88 
                                                 
83 See Myers v. Neb. Inv. Council, 724 N.W.2d 776, 798-99 (Neb. 2006). 
 
84 Id. at 799 (citing Adams v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 498 N.W.2d 577 (Neb. 1992)); 1 E. 
Allan Farnsworth, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.28 (2d ed. 1990). 
 
85 367 F.3d 1048, 1053 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 
86 Scovill v. WSYX/ABC, Sinclair Broad. Grp., Inc., 425 F.3d 1012, 1017-18 (6th Cir. 
2005) (citing Faber v. Menard, Inc., 367 F.3d 1048, 1054 (8th Cir. 2004)). 
 
87 See Williams, 350 F.2d at 450 (citing 1 ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 
128 (1963) (noting that “[t]he terms are to be considered ‘in the light of the general 
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case,’” and 
concluding that Corbin is correct that “the test as being whether the terms are ‘so extreme 
as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and business practices of the time 
and place’”). 
 
88 Compare D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 186 (1972) (finding that an 
agreement between two companies did not involve a “refusal to deal,” a contract of 




[41] It is unlikely that discovery limitation clauses in commercial 
contracts between businesses, as contemplated by this article, would run 
afoul of the unconscionability standards.  Not only would the entities be 
presumably sophisticated, even if not equally so, the contract limitations 
would be applicable to all of the parties to the agreement.  While it is true 
that one of the parties may benefit more than the other from having limited 
discovery when a particular dispute arises in the future, it is difficult to 
predict which party that will be.  Stated otherwise, unconscionability must 
be present at the time the contract is made.89  If one party claims a need 
for extensive discovery after a dispute arises, but cannot get it due to this 
type of agreement, the unconscionability doctrine is not implicated.90 
 
C.  Tort Claims by Contracting and Third Parties 
 
[42] Courts have routinely viewed contractual limitations with greater 
scrutiny when they impact tort claims, especially intentional torts.91  For 
example, in Rodenbur v. Kaufmann, the D.C. Circuit strictly interpreted a 
                                                                                                                         
adhesion, or unequal bargaining power), with Brennan v. Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. 
Supp. 2d 377, 382-83 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (voiding agreement signed by employee who 
“reasonably felt that she had no choice but to sign . . . or she would lose her job,” while 
noting that “inequality in bargaining power between employers and employees is not 
alone sufficient” to find unconscionability). 
 
89 See U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2011) (contract must be “unconscionable at the time it was 
made” to be unenforceable); see also AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1740 
(2011) (both the majority and dissenting opinions discuss hypothetical extension of 
unconscionability arguments under California law to restrictions on “full” and “judicially 
monitored” discovery in the context of arbitration agreements, seemingly indicating that 
such restrictions, at least in the setting of arbitration agreements, would not be subject to 
unconscionability attacks per se under, respectively, the holding of the majority opinion 
or the minority opinion’s view of existing jurisprudence).  But cf. Lau v. Mercedes-Benz 
USA, LLC, No. CV 11-1940, 2012 WL 370557, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012) (holding 
that Conception case did not preclude independent analysis and application of state law 




91  E.g., Rodenbur v. Kaufmann, 320 F.2d 679, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1963). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue 4 
 
 28 
jury waiver clause for all claims “arising” from a home lease, finding that 
in spite of the broad language, it was not intended to apply to tort claims.92  
Generally, while waivers of claims for negligent acts bind parties in most 
states, those provisions must be “clear, definite and unambiguous” and 
will not extend to recklessness, gross negligence, or intentional torts.93  
Therefore, courts might view contractual limitations on discovery 
differently if there are claims of fraud or statutory violations, such as 
antitrust claims, especially if there is a perception that a party is 
attempting to use discovery limitations to escape liability for intentional 
malfeasance. 
 
[43] A related consideration is remembering that while parties can 
contractually modify their legal obligations with regard to preservation 
between themselves such clauses will not prevent another person from 
asserting that an event triggered an independent preservation duty as to 
which the third person was the beneficiary.  While this argument seems 
axiomatic,94 there is a danger that contracting parties would overestimate 
the effect of contract clauses by disregarding the existence of other, non-
contracting parties that may be able to argue that a preservation duty was 
owed to them as a potential litigant.    
 
[44] Accordingly, parties considering the use of contractual discovery 
limitations should understand that a court may be more willing to consider 
                                                 
 
92 See id. at 684. 
 
93 Standard Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 186 F.2d 44, 47 (10th Cir. 1951); 
see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 574 (1932). 
 
 
94 Compare Hittson v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. 86 P.2d 1037, 1039 (N.M. 1939) 
(stating that a person can waive any contractual, statutory, or constitutional right 
“provided it is intended for his sole benefit, and does not infringe upon the rights of 
others, and such waiver is not against public policy”), with Point Blank Solutions, Inc. v. 
Toyobo Am., Inc., No. 09-6116-CIV, 2011 WL 1456029, at *26 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2011) 
(finding that reasonable anticipation of investigation by government and suit by Second 
Chance Inc., did not trigger duty to preserve documents for other, then-unknown future 
plaintiffs). 
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a challenge to a commercial discovery agreement in a case involving 
extra-contractual claims of fraud, intellectual property theft, unfair 
business practices, or cases that impact non-parties to the contract.  
Likewise, parties should understand that contractual limitations between 
the parties will not affect any preservation duties that arise separately 
where other persons could claim that information should have been 
preserved with respect to any matter involving such persons. 
  
D.  Usurpation of Judicial Authority and Conflicts with 
Procedural Rules 
 
[45] Similar to judges’ occasional refusal to enforce contractual 
provisions based on overriding public interests, they may also reject 
provisions that seek to limit discovery by restraining judicial discretion or 
inherent powers.  Judges have the inherent authority to hold persons in 
contempt of court,95 to impose sanctions, to directly question witnesses, 96 
to call witnesses whom the parties do not wish to call,97 and to demand the 
production of evidence.98  Notably, court opinions and the Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws have stated that forum courts will always apply their 
jurisdiction’s own procedural rules while deferring to the parties’ choice 
of substantive rules.99  This authority raises an important issue for parties 
seeking to limit discovery because the discovery rules are part of the state 
                                                 
95 See Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 435, 450 (1911) (holding that 
court’s power to hold people in contempt is a “necessary and integral part of the 
independence of the judiciary, and is absolutely essential to the performance of the[ir] 
duties”). 
 
96 FED. R. EVID. 614(b); see Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 333, 336 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 
97 See United States v. Ostrer, 422 F. Supp. 95, 103 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (stating that the 
court’s power to call witnesses is rarely invoked). 
 
98 See McKinley v. S. Pac. Co., 181 P.2d 899, 908 (1947). 
 
99 See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Aalco Express Co., 592 F. Supp. 
664, 666 (E.D. Mo. 1984); Finch v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 469 A.2d 867, 887  (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1984); Morris v. Watsco, Inc., 433 N.E.2d 886, 889 (Mass. 1982); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971). 
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and federal rules of civil procedure.100  In light of the fact that certain laws 
are found to be procedural, including general statutes of limitations, 
discovery-limiting agreements may be at risk for rejection as part of the 
same group.101 
 
[46] On the other hand, it is important to note that these discovery 
agreements are not intended to force courts to apply the discovery rules of 
other jurisdictions, which is precisely the reason cited for rejecting parties’ 
choice of procedural rulesit is inefficient and unfair to ask courts to 
apply rules that they are unfamiliar with, especially when those rules will 
not regularly have a substantive effect on the outcome of a case.102  
Rather, the goal of the contractual discovery limitations is twofold.  First, 
they function to establish agreed upon specifics to better define common 
law duties, state rules, and federal rules so that parties can conduct their 
preservation and production with predictable consequences instead of 
arguing over interpretation later.  Second, the limitations narrow the scope 
of those same discovery rules, but do so within the procedural framework 
that those rules have established without exceeding their bounds or 
introducing procedures from other jurisdictions.  These limitations, while 
they undoubtedly affect procedure, do not replace local rules.  They 
merely attempt to achieve the same clarity and reasonable limits that are 
the goals of the model orders, scheduling orders, and other court initiatives 
discussed above. 
 
[47] However, not all courts have foreclosed upon the possibility of 
enforcing procedural choices.  One federal court stated: “[t]his Court does 
not decide whether the parties to a collective bargaining agreement or a 
                                                 
100 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26; Klonoski v. Mahlab, 156 F.3d 255, 271 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(discussing the rules of evidence and their relationship to the federal discovery rules).  
 
101 See Aalco Express Co., Inc., 592 F. Supp. at 667. 
 
102 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469 (1965) (relying on the same substantive 
versus procedural distinctions in the Erie doctrine context to hold that the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure apply whenever “the difference between the two [state and federal] 
rules would be of scant, if any, relevance to the choice of a forum”). 
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pension trust agreement can . . . provide expressly for a particular [a 
procedural rule].”103  This possibility is echoed by the Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws, which states, “[o]ne factor is whether the issue is one to 
which the parties are likely to have given thought in the course of entering 
into the transaction.”104  Therefore, the parties should include language 
stating that it is their understanding that these provisions will be 
enforceable even if they are treated as procedural rules.  In fact, this type 
of broad provision has been used successfully in the past.105 
 
[48] Additionally, parties can minimize the chance that uncertainty on 
this point will be exploited as a way to frustrate the agreement by deciding 
to indemnify each other for the expenses associated with any effort to 
dispute the agreement’s enforceability.  When used in conjunction with 
the stipulations discussed in the preceding paragraph, any remaining 
incentive to dispute the agreement’s enforceability is eliminated.  While 
the contractual understanding that the rules will be enforced even if they 
are determined to be procedural makes the chances of prevailing on this 
issue low, the indemnification provisions should remove any incentive to 
dispute this fact. 
 
[49] It is worth mentioning that courts often look at state public policy 
to decide choice of law issues alongside the distinction between 
substantive and procedural rules.106  We have already stated our position 
                                                 
103 Aalco Express Co., 592 F. Supp. at 667. 
 
104 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 cmt. a (1971). 
 
105 See Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1104-05 (N.D. Cal. 
2003) (giving effect to an agreement that “[t]he law of the State of New York will apply 
in all respects, including but not limited to determination of applicable statutes of 
limitation and available remedies,” as incorporating procedural elements such as statutes 
of limitation). 
 
106 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941) (reasoning 
that “[i]t is not for the federal courts to thwart . . . local policies” and finding that states 
are “free to determine whether a given matter is to be governed by the law of the forum 
or some other law”). 
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that public policy concerns will not result in discovery limitations being 
voided.  However, parties can strengthen this position by additionally 
indemnifying one another against the costs of disputing this aspect of 
enforceability. 
 
V.  SAMPLE CONTRACTUAL TERMS 
 
[50] We have included in the Appendix a sample contractual provision 
setting forth our vision of complete eDiscovery limiting provisions.  It is 
our hope that practitioners will be able to use this contractual language as 
a starting point in negotiating these clauses into their agreements where 
appropriate. 
 
[51] Broadly, the terms are intended to limit discovery rather than to 
dictate the manner of discovery.  This is in keeping with the goal of letting 
each court employ its own procedural rules, but prospectively agreeing to 
define the actions that will be available to parties under those rules.  This 
approach also avoids any issues that could be raised by contractually 
requiring a party to undertake an action that may be proscribed by privacy 
law or a blocking statute.  Apart from the less controversial undertakings 
regarding cooperation, these provisions generally focus on what parties are 
agreeing not to do, rather than what they will do.  There are several 
operative principles embodied in the language in the Appendix: 
 
1. Preservation only required upon notice 
Parties will not be held liable for failures to preserve unless and 
until a notice of claim has been received from the other party. 
2. Adequate preservation steps defined 
A party complying with the requirements set forth in the 
sample language will be deemed to have met their preservation 
obligations.  Extraordinary steps, such as preservation of 
backup tapes or volatile memory, are expressly excluded from 
a party’s obligations. 
3. Limit collection and search 
The model language includes strict numeric limits on 
custodians and server based systems.  If a party includes data 
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from a non-enumerated custodian in order to support its own 
claims or defenses, that custodian is then deemed “in play.” 
4. Require actual knowledge for sanctions 
No party will be held liable for sanctions absent a showing of 
actual knowledge supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
[52] These principles, combined with the indemnification and 
cooperation provisions, should provide an adequate framework for parties 
to thoughtfully and cost-effectively manage the eDiscovery process. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
[53] Despite speculation that new Federal Rules may be on the horizon, 
with the states presumably to follow, companies should take matters into 
their own hands and limit discovery without governmental or judicial 
intervention in order to save costs.  While organizations have not yet 
tested this concept in the form of contractual agreements that have been 
litigated, the emergence of local standing orders and local rules supports 
the general proposition that more clearly defined obligations and 
procedures help reduce costs and burdens for everyone, including the 
judiciary.  Indeed, where both parties to a commercial contract recognize 
the problem, a cooperative effort to preemptively limit discovery should 
produce significant cost savings for both parties with little downside.  
None of the traditional indicia of unenforceabilitysuch as harm to public 
interests, usurpation of judicial power, or unequal bargaining powerare 
present.  In such circumstances, it is hard to imagine that courts would be 
disposed to do anything except find ways to enforce the parties’ 
agreements regarding preservation and discovery obligations. 
 
[54] In going down the path of self-imposed discovery limitations, 
companies should nevertheless understand the potential limitations on 
contractual provisions that purport to limit discovery and preservation 
duties.  First, the agreements are unlikely to apply to circumstances 
involving non-contractual claims, especially those involving persons that 
were not involved in the contract.  Second, it is also less likely that a court 
will enforce the limitations when tort or statutory claims are alleged, even 
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in jurisdictions that permit tort claims to proceed in conjunction with 
contract claims.  Third, it is less likely that the provision would be upheld 
as part of a contract outside the commercial context (i.e., there is a greater 
likelihood that courts would refuse to impose such contractual limitations 
on individual consumers).  Fourth, courts always retain inherent authority 
despite what the parties may agree upon, and a court may exercise that 
power if it perceives that the limitations are working some fundamental 
unfairness to the resolution of the dispute.   
 
APPENDIX:  SAMPLE CONTRACT LANGUAGE 
 
I. Disputes:  Discovery.  The Parties recognize that the costs of 
litigation, arbitration, or any other mode of dispute resolution can 
be substantial.  Each Party agrees that in the interests of 
minimizing dispute resolution costs, speeding resolution time, and 
decreasing uncertainty of costs, it may be desirable for both 
Parties to waive certain rights to which it would otherwise avail 
itself.  Accordingly, the Parties agree, with respect to any 
litigation, arbitration, mediation, or any other claim arising under 
or related to this Agreement: 
II. Definitions:  The following terms, as used herein, have the 
following meanings: 
a. “Claim Amount” means the total amount of any 
costs, claims, liability, or expenses which the 
claiming Party is seeking from another Party, 
exclusive of any interest, punitive or exemplary 
damages. 
b. “Custodian” means a person having control of 
specific discoverable documents.  An “Individual 
Custodian” is a person who has control of its 
own individual files.  A “System Custodian” has 
control of a warehouse, online system, or other 
server based information store in which data is 
not necessarily associated with a single 
Custodian. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue 4 
 
 35 
c. “Document” means any information that is fixed 
in a tangible form and any information that is 
stored in a medium from which it can be 
retrieved and examined, whether physically or 
electronically.  Unless specified otherwise, the 
term “Document” includes both paper and 
electronically stored information. 
d. “Legal Hold Notice” means a notice distributed 
to potential Custodians within a Party’s 
organization which sets forth the basic substance 
of the dispute and enumerates the documents to 
be preserved and which notifies the Custodian of 
its obligations to preserve such documents. 
e. “Notice of Dispute” means a notice by one Party 
to the designated notice contact of another Party, 
setting forth the substance of the dispute, the 
timeframe of the relevant facts, a listing of initial 
known participants, the amount in dispute, and 
making specific reference to this Agreement and 
the preservation obligations specified herein. 
f. “Producing Party” means the Party upon which a 
discovery request has been made. 
g. “Requesting Party” means the Party making a 
request for discovery. 
h. “Server Based Systems” are centralized 
computer systems on a network that are shared 
by multiple users of the network, including but 
not limited to email hosts, web servers, FTP 
sites, and databases.  Certain systems, such as 
email systems, can be considered Server Based 
Systems for certain functions such as logging and 
user privileges, but data such as individual email 
mailboxes are considered part of an Individual 
Custodian’s information. 
III. Preservation of Information. 
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a. Within a reasonable time after receipt of a Notice of 
Dispute, the Parties shall:  
i. Issue a Legal Hold Notice to its current 
employees directly involved with the subject 
matter of the dispute directing those employees 
to preserve relevant documents in their 
possession (with notices sent to additional 
current employees directly involved as those 
additional employees are identified); 
ii. Take reasonable steps to preserve responsive 
Documents in the custody of current employees 
subject to a Legal Hold Notice who are 
terminated or transferred; and 
iii. Take reasonable steps to preserve responsive 
Documents located in Server Based Systems. 
b. No Party shall be required to preserve any Documents 
or other information beyond these steps.  Specifically 
excluded from preservation are [include as appropriate]: 
i. Backup tapes;   
ii. Information or Documents in the possession of 
third party service providers; 
iii. Server logs;  
iv. Information stored in volatile memory; and 
v. Transient metadata. 
c. No party is obligated to take preservation efforts prior to 
receiving the written Notice of Dispute and the Parties 
agree that they will not argue that any failure to 
preserve information prior to receiving the written 
Notice of Dispute is culpable, wrongful, or sanctionable 
in any fashion. 
d. The Parties acknowledge that these preservation steps 
may be less than what might be otherwise required 
absent this agreement and may be insufficient to 
preserve many documents that might ultimately be 
discoverable in litigation, but expressly agree to limit 
the Parties’ preservation obligations as set forth herein.    
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IV. Production of Documents. 
a. Determination of Individual Custodians.  The parties 
agree that: 
i. In matters where the Claim Amount involves less 
than $5 Million, each Party shall only be required 
to collect, search and produce Documents from 
no more than five (5) Individual Custodians 
directly involved in the dispute. 
ii. In matters where the Claim Amount is greater 
than $5 Million, the collection and production 
shall be limited to no more than twenty (20) 
Individual Custodians. 
iii. The Requesting Party shall be entitled to identify 
the Individual Custodians specified in paragraphs 
i. and ii. above from whom documents are to be 
collected, by name or job responsibility.   
iv. In the event that a Producing Party voluntarily 
produces Documents from an Individual 
Custodian not designated by a Requesting Party 
pursuant to paragraphs i. and ii. above (i.e. to 
support its own claims or defenses), such 
Producing Party may be required, upon request 
of the Requesting Party, to collect, search and 
produce Documents from such Individual 
Custodian. 
b. Server Based Systems.  The Parties agree that, upon 
request, each Party shall furnish to the other a listing 
of those Server Based Systems which are likely to 
contain responsive Documents, including the name of 
the system, a brief description of the system, a brief 
description of the likely responsive data stored in the 
system, a good faith estimate of the number of 
records likely to be responsive and their size, and the 
name and title of the System Custodian.  Each Party 
shall only be required to collect, search, and produce 
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Documents from no more than three (3) Server Based 
Systems as requested by a Requesting Party. 
V. Liability. 
a. No Party shall be liable for the deletion or destruction 
of any Discovery Materials unless such Party had 
actual knowledge of the relevance of such Discovery 
Materials at the time of deletion or destruction [after 
receiving receipt of a written Notice of Dispute.]107 
b. Absent a claim of fraud, misrepresentation, or bad 
faith supported by clear and convincing evidence, no 
Producing Party shall be liable for, and no 
Requesting Party shall seek any remedy for 
spoliation, adverse inference instruction or other 
sanction from any Producing Party provided such 
Producing Party has complied with its obligations 
under this Section. 
VI. Procedures and Cooperation. 
a. The Parties agree that any protective order, case 
management order, or similar order governing 
preservation and discovery shall incorporate the 
terms of this Section.  The Parties further agree that 
they shall agree to an order pursuant to Rule 502(d) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar 
provision providing for the return of privileged 
documents and preventing the waiver of such 
privilege in the case of such returned documents. 
b. The Parties may, by mutual agreement, modify any 
of the provisions of this Section.  The Parties agree to 
cooperate to the extent practical in the conduct of 
discovery.  Specifically, the Parties shall endeavor to: 
i. Utilize internal ESI discovery “point persons” to 
assist counsel in preparing requests and 
responses; 
                                                 
107 The bracketed language is optional. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology     Volume XVIII, Issue 4 
 
 39 
ii. Exchange information on relevant data sources, 
including those not being searched, or schedule 
early disclosures on the topic of Electronically 
Stored Information; 
iii. Jointly develop automated search and retrieval 
methodologies to cull relevant information; 
iv. Promote early identification of form or forms of 
production; 
v. Develop case-long discovery budgets based on 
proportionality principles; and 
vi. Consider court-appointed experts, volunteer 
mediators, or formal ADR programs to resolve 
discovery disputes.   
VII. Indemnification:  If any Requesting Party seeks to compel a 
Producing Party to require greater preservation, collection, or 
production requirements than are set forth herein (or seeks relief 
based upon the other party’s failure to preserve, collect or produce 
documents beyond the obligations contained herein), or otherwise 
breaches any of the provisions of this Section, or challenges the 
enforceability of any provisions of this Section, the Requesting 
Party shall indemnify the other Party for any costs associated with 
defending against such efforts and any costs incurred as a result of 
any increased requirements that may result from such efforts, 
including all reasonable legal fees, outside vendor costs, and 
internal expenses associated with the collection, review, redaction, 
and production of such documents. 
